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PATENT  “TROLLS”  AND  CLAIM  CONSTRUCTION
Greg Reilly*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the largely overlooked relationship between claim construction and
patent assertion entities (patent “trolls”), finding that claim construction problems and trends
benefit patent assertion entities.  First, the Federal Circuit’s deep divide over the proper approach
to claim construction creates uncertain patent scope, which is widely recognized as a core reason
for the success of patent assertion entities.  Second, case law and commentary increasingly
endorse an approach to claim construction that relies on the “general meaning” in the technical
field with limited reliance on the patent itself, which benefits patent assertion entities by increas-
ing the breadth and uncertainty of patent scope.  Third, the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of a
more deferential standard of review for claim construction in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
v. Sandoz, Inc. increases the benefits patent assertion entities receive from filing in favorable
district courts, like the Eastern District of Texas, as well as their incentives to do so.
If patent assertion entities are as problematic as widely thought, these claim construction
problems and trends warrant reconsideration.  Current claim construction rules and trends may
be warranted despite their positive impact on patent assertion entities.  And other means may
exist for combatting patent assertion entities without altering claim construction rules or trends.
But the positive effects for patent assertion entities must at least be factored into any cost-benefit
analysis of claim construction rules.  Moreover, the fact that current claim construction rules
and trends produce the conditions under which patent assertion entities thrive suggests that
patent assertion entities may be a symptom of larger problems with claim construction doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
Patent claim construction—the interpretation of the short paragraphs
(or “claims”) at the end of the patent that define the scope of the patentee’s
rights—is “overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in litigation.”1  It is
© 2016 Greg Reilly.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis
of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (emphasis omitted).
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also one of the most problematic and controversial.  As one commentator
explained:
Debates over whether the fundamental inquiry of patent law is broken, and
what to do if it is, engross not only observers of the patent system, but also
the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellate
court entrusted with the control of patent law.2
Patent assertion entities—also known as non-practicing entities or, more
pejoratively, patent “trolls”3—are also one of the most important, controver-
sial, and arguably problematic issues in modern patent litigation.  The debate
over patent assertion entities has divided academics,4 led Congress to debate
major patent reform for the second time in less than five years,5 and even
caught the attention of the popular media, including an eleven-minute seg-
ment on Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.6
Yet, the intersection of what are two of the most important, controver-
sial, and problematic aspects of modern patent litigation has been largely
overlooked.  Unexplored are the related questions of how claim construction
has contributed to the rise and/or viability of patent assertion entities and
what concerns about patent assertion entities mean for the claim construc-
tion debates.  Frankly, this is surprising.  Problems with patent scope—both
uncertainty and overbreadth of patent scope—are frequently identified as
contributing to the rise and success of patent assertion entities.7  And “claim
construction is fundamental to determining a patent’s scope.”8  The poten-
tial link between claim construction and patent assertion entities is, well,
patent.
2 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive
Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2007).
3 The terms patent assertion entity (PAE), non-practicing entity (NPE), and patent
troll (“troll”) have different connotations but are often used interchangeably. See David L.
Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014).
4 Compare Letter from 51 Legal and Economics Scholars Who Study Innovation, Intel-
lectual Property Law, and Policy, to Congress (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.utdallas.edu/
~ugg041000/IPScholarsLettertoCongress_March_2_2015.pdf (“PAE litigation has been
costing firms tens of billions of dollars per year since 2007.”), with Letter from 40 Econo-
mists and Law Professors Who Conduct Research in Patent Law and Policy, to Congress
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-
Profs-Letter-re-Patent-Reform.pdf (“[M]uch of the information surrounding the patent
policy discussion, and in particular the discussion of so-called ‘patent trolls,’ is either inac-
curate or does not support the conclusions for which it is cited.”).
5 See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
179 (2015) (providing overview of current patent reform efforts); see also Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012).
6 LAST WEEK TONIGHT, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents, https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA (Original HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015).
7 James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis Is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-
patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/.
8 Lefstin, supra note 2, at 1034.
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This Article tackles the overlooked connection between patent assertion
entities and claim construction.  In broad strokes, the Article develops three
major themes.  First, problems with claim construction are significant con-
tributors to the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope, which fuel patent
assertion entities.  Second, current trends in claim construction, both in the
courts and the academy, will benefit patent assertion entities.  Third, the
problems and trends in claim construction undermine other efforts to com-
bat patent assertion entities by making it easier for patent assertion entities to
assert a non-frivolous litigation position supportable under current law.
More specifically, an outcome-determinative split within the Federal Cir-
cuit as to the proper approach to claim construction creates significant
uncertainty about claim scope that cannot be resolved without litigation.9
Uncertain claim scope is widely seen as fueling patent assertion entities.  Yet,
courts and commentators are increasingly ignoring or downplaying the claim
construction split when discussing patent notice problems.  Some even sug-
gest, contrary to empirical evidence, that the split has been resolved.10
Second, a claim construction approach that emphasizes the general
meaning in the technical field and permits only limited resort to the disclo-
sure in the patent itself continues to garner precedential and scholarly sup-
port.  This approach undermines ex ante predictability of claim scope
because it depends on testimony of expert witnesses and other evidence cre-
ated or identified by the parties ex post in litigation, rather than on the pub-
licly available and static patent document.  Moreover, even its proponents
acknowledge that it produces broader claim scope.  Uncertain and broad
claim scope are conditions in which patent assertion entities thrive, and,
unsurprisingly, they tend to rely on the general meaning line of cases.11  Yet,
even as general trends in patent law seek to constrain patent assertion enti-
ties, case law and scholars increasingly endorse the general meaning claim
construction approach.12
Finally, the standard of appellate review for claim construction has long
been the focal point of claim construction debates, with widespread calls in
the academy and the bar for more deferential review.  The Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. heeded those
calls, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard and providing greater
deference to district court claim constructions. Teva largely has been lauded
by the patent community, even though it is likely to help patent assertion
entities.13  After Teva, district judges have incentives to place greater reliance
on expert evidence and other external evidence, and less reliance on the
patent document itself, which will tend to create broader claims and greater
uncertainty.  Moreover, patent assertion entities overwhelmingly file in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which tends to favor
9 See infra subsection II.A.1.
10 See infra subsection II.A.2.
11 See infra subsection II.B.1.
12 See infra subsection II.B.2.
13 See infra subsection II.C.2.
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patentees in a variety of ways, likely including claim construction.  More def-
erential review means more power for district courts, which accentuates pat-
ent assertion entities’ advantage from choosing the forum and incentivizes
districts that cater to patent assertion entities to adopt pro-patentee claim
constructions.14
Having described the connection between claim construction problems
and trends and patent assertion entities, the obvious question is what does it
all mean?  For those untroubled by patent assertion entities, perhaps not
much.  But for the majority of the patent community that worries, to varying
extents, about the consequences of patent assertion entities for innovation,
competition, and patent litigation, this Article suggests that the current direc-
tion of claim construction is far from optimal.15  Claim construction trends
also indirectly undermine other efforts to combat patent assertion entities.  A
variety of current proposals—pleading standards, Rule 11 sanctions, fee shift-
ing—attempt to punish patent assertion entities for bringing frivolous, merit-
less, or weak claims.  However, the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim
scope created by the claim construction issues addressed in this Article make
it easier for a patent assertion entity to identify a reasonable litigation posi-
tion, undermining efforts to weed out claims based on their merits.16
Of course, there may be ways to address patent assertion entities without
altering the direction of claim construction, such as venue reform, restricting
functional claiming, or improving patent examination.  And some may
believe that current claim construction rules and trends are warranted
despite (or except for) their effect on patent assertion entities.  At the very
least, however, claim construction should be part of the patent assertion
entity debate and the consequences for patent assertion entities should be
part of the claim construction debates.17  Moreover, the fact that current
claim construction rules and trends produce the conditions in which patent
assertion entities thrive suggests that patent assertion entities may be a symp-
tom that reveals underlying problems with claim construction doctrine.18
Interestingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, while courts, scholars, and
most other commentators have overlooked the relationship between claim
construction and patent assertion entities, the most popular targets for pat-
ent assertion entities—large technology companies like Google, Amazon,
Yahoo!, Dell, and Twitter—have not.  In amicus briefs in the Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court, these companies reached conclusions similar to this
Article’s: the claim construction split results in uncertain patent scope; a pat-
14 See infra subsection II.C.1.
15 See infra Section III.A.
16 See infra Section III.B.
17 See infra Section III.A.
18 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013) (“Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a symptom of
larger problems with the patent system. . . . Exposing the larger problems allows us to
contemplate changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying pathologies of
the patent system and the abusive conduct they enable.”).
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ent-focused approach better promotes public notice than the “general mean-
ing” approach; and deferential appellate review undermines public notice
and benefits patent holders.19  These technology companies were clearly
motivated by their experience with patent assertion entities, though they left
the link largely implicit.20  This Article makes that link explicit.
Part I provides an overview of the parallel debates over patent assertion
entities and claim construction.  Part II draws the connections between claim
construction and patent assertion entities.  Part III evaluates the conse-
quences of these connections.  A short conclusion follows.
I. PATENT LITIGATION PROBLEMS: “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Patent assertion entities and claim construction have been two of the
most discussed and debated topics in patent law since the turn of this cen-
tury, probably only rivaled or surpassed by patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.  This Part provides brief background on the debates over
each, before turning to the relationship of patent assertion entities and claim
construction in the remainder of the Article.
A. The Patent “Troll” Debate
1. Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debate
In recent years, patent assertion entities have been central to most
debates over the patent system.  Patent assertion entities are estimated to
have brought over fifty percent of all patent litigation in recent years.21  They
have received attention, and often criticism, from the White House, Con-
gress, Supreme Court Justices, Federal Circuit judges, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), corporations and industry groups, academics, the popu-
lar press, and the public at large.22
Although the exact terminology and definitions vary, in rough terms,
patent assertion entities are patent holders that do not commercialize inven-
19 Brief for Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20–22, Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) [hereinafter Google et al. Teva Br.]
(joined by Dell, HP, Salesforce.com, Twitter, Yahoo!, Acushnet, eBay, Kaspersky Lab, Lime-
light Networks, Newegg, QVC, SAS Institute, and Xilink); Brief for Google Inc. et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 24–25, 25 n.3, Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v.
Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Google et al.
Lighting Ballast Br.] (en banc) (joined by Amazon, HP, Red Hat, and Yahoo!).
20 Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19, at 26–27.
21 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 5 (2013)
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/patent_report.pdf.
22 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 2; BRIAN T. YEH, CONGR.
RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1–2 (Apr. 16,
2014); Randall R. Rader et al., Opinion, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court
.html.
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tions or transfer technology ex ante in a way that helps other companies
develop products.  Instead, patent assertion entities purchase patents for the
purpose of extracting licensing fees by suing (or threatening to sue) compa-
nies that have already developed products allegedly covered by the patent.23
A vigorous debate exists within the patent community regarding patent
assertion entities.  The majority view is that patent assertion entities tax inno-
vation, stifle research and development, enrich investors at the expense of
product-producing companies, increase litigation and litigation costs, and
bring weak claims.  The minority view contends that criticisms of patent asser-
tion entities are overblown and unsupported and/or that patent assertion
entities are actually beneficial to innovation by adding liquidity to the patent
market and increasing the returns for small inventors.24
The merits of this debate are complex, perhaps intractable, and beyond
the Article’s scope.  Instead, the Article suggests that current claim construc-
tion rules and trends benefit, and perhaps even fuel, the patent assertion
entity business model.  Those interested in reforms to restrict patent asser-
tion entities would be well-advised to focus at least some of their attention on
claim construction.
2. The Relationship of Patent “Trolls” to Uncertain and Broad Claim
Scope
Claim scope is central to discussions (especially criticisms) of patent
assertion entities, with patent assertion entities associated with uncertain and
broad claim scope.
First, the existence and success of patent assertion entities are often
attributed to patents with “fuzzy boundaries” and vague claims.25  Leading
commentators suggest that patent assertion entities purposefully seek out
patents with vague or ambiguous claim language for purchase.26  This allows
patent assertion entities to target technology that is different than that dis-
closed in the patent and developed after the patent issued but has now
become firmly established and extract payments from those dependent on a
particular technology.27  Relatedly, vagueness in claim language allows pat-
ent assertion entities to assert their patents broadly to cover a wide range of
technology that exists in the market, technology that may only have a tangen-
tial relationship to that described in the patent.28  Importantly, technology
users cannot avoid infringement before developing or adopting a technology
because the vague claim language hinders ex ante efforts to identify or
design around the subsequently asserted patent.29
23 WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 3–4.
24 YEH, supra note 22, at 4–8.
25 Id. at 9–10.
26 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter
2011–2012, at 26, 26.
27 Id.; Bessen, supra note 7.
28 Bessen, supra note 7.
29 Id.
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Second, patent assertion entities are often said to rely on overly broad
claim scope, whether due to the inherent breadth of the patent claims or
because the ambiguity and vagueness of claim language permits the patent
assertion entity to read the claim broadly.30  Broad patent scope allows the
patent assertion entity to assert the patent against now-established technolo-
gies developed after the patent issued, as well as to assert it broadly against a
large number of products and companies.  The result is increased returns
from the patent assertion entity’s investment in a patent.31
That patent assertion entities most commonly assert patents on software-
related inventions supports the importance of ambiguous and broad claim
scope to their business model.32  The most likely reason for the popularity of
software patents among patent assertion entities is that software patents tend
to have vague and broad claim language, often written in “functional” terms
that define a goal, rather than a specific means of achieving that goal.33
B. Claim Construction Problems
1. The Relationship of Claim Construction and Patent Scope
The legal rights conferred by a patent are judged by the “claims” at the
end of the patent: numbered paragraphs that describe the scope of the
invention in a single, often tortuously written sentence.  Like the words of
any other legal document, patent claims must be interpreted to be applied.
This process is called “claim construction” in patent lingo.  Claim construc-
tion is widely recognized as the most important step in patent litigation.  It is
a threshold step for virtually every other issue in a patent case.  And it is often
case-dispositive or at least case-determinative (limiting the issues, the range
of the dispute, facilitating settlement, etc.) because there is little dispute over
how the technology works.34
The meaning of patent claim terms, like all words, is determined by the
context in which they are used.  The context for patent claim terms includes
the rest of the claim at issue, other claims in the patent, the description of
the invention in the part of the patent referred to as the “specification,” and
the record of the proceedings for obtaining the patent in the Patent and
Trademark Office.  These sources of context are known as “intrinsic evi-
dence.”  The context for patent claim terms also includes information about
the background meaning of the term to a skilled person in the field (known
as a “person having ordinary skill in the art” in patent lingo), as evidenced by
30 WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
31 WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6; Bessen, supra note 7.
32 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 387, 394 (2014) (noting that sixty-two percent of NPE lawsuits involve software
patents).
33 WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8; see also Mark A. Lemley, Software
Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905.
34 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader Stan-
dard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 246, 256–57 (2014).
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dictionaries, treatises, other scientific texts, other patents, and expert testi-
mony.  These sources of context are known as extrinsic evidence.35  The rela-
tive weight of the intrinsic context versus extrinsic context is hotly disputed,
as discussed in subsection I.B.2 below.
Claim construction is crucial to both the certainty and breadth of patent
claims.  “[C]laim construction is fundamental to determining a patent’s
scope”36 because the terms in a patent claim only acquire meaning, and
therefore scope, when they are interpreted in the relevant context (i.e., con-
strued).  Therefore, the process for interpreting claims—what context is con-
sulted, in what order, for what purpose, etc.—will determine whether a claim
has broad or narrow scope.37  Likewise, the extent to which the process for
interpreting claims is well-known, predictable, and easily replicable ex ante is
a significant determinant of the certainty or uncertainty (more accurately,
predictability or unpredictability) of patent scope.38
Unsurprisingly, uncertainty and overbreadth in patent claim scope often
are associated with claim construction problems.  For example, one commen-
tator noted that “uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim construc-
tion has led to uncertainty in patent scope, which in turn negates the notice
and boundary-staking functions to be performed by the patent claim.”39
Another commentator pointed to flaws with the approach to claim construc-
tion as the cause of problematic breadth of patent claims.40
2. Claim Construction Problems and Trends
Debates over claim construction have focused on two core problems.
First, the primary focus of commentators has been the “uncertainty” created
by the Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal of district court claim construc-
tion decisions.41  In previous work, I referred to the uncertainty created by
high reversal rates as “ex post uncertainty” because it only affected the ability
to evaluate claim scope after litigation had been filed and after the district
court had issued a claim construction decision.  I argued that “ex post uncer-
tainty” was far less significant than the difficulty of evaluating claim scope in
advance of litigation, which I called “ex ante unpredictability.”  Because the
Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate had little to no effect on ex ante predict-
ability, I questioned the importance of the standard of review.42
35 See id. at 257–64.
36 Lefstin, supra note 2, at 1034.
37 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 103–04 (2005).
38 See id. at 99–100.
39 Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 64
(2006) (footnote omitted).
40 See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 15–16 (2012).
41 Lefstin, supra note 2, at 1034.
42 See Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong
Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43, 47–49 (2013).
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Regardless, conventional wisdom held that the Federal Circuit’s de novo
standard of claim construction review created uncertain claim scope, with
“an avalanche of critical commentary” and repeated, sharply split Federal Cir-
cuit en banc decisions.43  Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Teva Pharmaceuti-
cals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. held that the Federal Circuit must review the
“evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction for “clear error,” rather
than de novo.44
The second major problem with claim construction—a deep and persis-
tent split within the precedent as to the proper approach to claim construc-
tion—has received comparatively less attention than the standard of review.
Yet, because it directly affects ex ante predictability of claim scope, it is far
more important.45  Although variably described, commentators generally
agree there are two identifiable and conflicting methodological approaches.
The primary difference between the two approaches is to what extent claim
construction should rely on the written description of the invention found in
the patent specification and to what extent it should rely on the background
or general meaning of the claim term in the field of invention.  Put another
way, the split is over what constitutes the primary context for understanding
patent claim terms: the patent itself or the background or general knowledge
in the field.46
The first claim construction methodology, which I call the “general
meaning” approach (and others refer to as the “heavy presumption” or “pro-
cedural” approach), emphasizes the background or general meaning in the
field, with only a limited role for the specification to alter this meaning.
Under this approach, claim construction begins with a “heavy presumption”
in favor of the “general,” “plain,” and/or “ordinary” meaning of the claim
term to a skilled person in the field.  Although not explicitly stated, this gen-
eral meaning is presumably identified through extrinsic evidence of the
understanding in the field, such as expert testimony, dictionaries, or scien-
tific texts.  Claim construction then turns to the specification to see if the
patentee varied this general meaning.  Importantly, this approach severely
limits variance from the general meaning, permitting a “quite narrow” excep-
tion to general meaning only if the specification meets an “exacting stan-
dard.”  Specifically, the patentee must have “clearly set forth” an express
definition different from the general meaning or used “expressions of mani-
fest exclusion or restriction” that clearly and unmistakably disclaimed claim
scope.47
43 Lefstin, supra note 2, at 1034; see also Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs.
N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (deciding case with six judges
joining majority opinion, one judge concurring, and four judges dissenting).
44 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
45 See generally Reilly, supra note 42.
46 For a more detailed description and analysis of the methodological split, see Reilly,
supra note 34, at 246–48, 256–66, upon which the following paragraphs rely.
47 See, e.g., Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.
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The second approach to claim construction, which I call the “patent-
focused approach” (and others refer to as the “Phillips,” “Vitronics,” or “holis-
tic” approach) emphasizes the meaning that the claim term bears in the pat-
ent itself, regardless of the meaning it would generally have in the field of the
invention.  A claim term’s meaning is primarily derived by the contextual
clues provided in the specification, which can define a claim term explicitly
or implicitly.  Extrinsic evidence can provide useful background information
to understand the specification but cannot support a claim interpretation
broader than that suggested by the specification.48
The Federal Circuit’s 2005 en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.
seemed to resolve the methodological split in favor of a patent-focused
approach.49  Unfortunately, empirical evidence demonstrates that the Fed-
eral Circuit’s precedent remains as divided on claim construction methodol-
ogy as before Phillips.50  Despite Phillips’s fairly clear endorsement of a
patent-focused approach, “courts have quietly been shifting back towards a
‘heavy presumption of ordinary meaning’ . . . with only limited exceptions
when there has been lexicography or an express disclaimer,” a “trend [that]
has been largely without fanfare.”51
The methodological split is not just a matter of semantics.  Federal Cir-
cuit judges acknowledge a “fundamental split within the court as to . . . the
proper approach to claim interpretation.”52  Empirical evidence confirms
that the outcome of claim construction appeals depends on the methodolog-
ical preference of the panel of Federal Circuit judges and that most disputes
over claim construction result from disagreements over methodology.  Spe-
cifically, ninety-five percent of splits within Federal Circuit panels and sev-
enty-five to eighty-two percent of Federal Circuit reversals of district court
claim constructions result from differences in the methodological approach
applied.53
C. The Disconnect Between Patent “Troll” Debates and
Claim Construction Debates
The role of claim construction has been largely absent from debates
over patent assertion entities.  Claim construction reform is not on the
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
For further description of this approach, see Reilly, supra note 34, at 262–63.
48 An example of this approach is Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  For further description of this approach, see Reilly, supra note
34, at 263–64.
49 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
50 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 133–35.
51 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on Claim
Construction, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Oct. 9, 2013).
52 Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en banc).
53 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1144–45, 1163–70 (2004).
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agenda for current patent reform efforts focused on combatting patent asser-
tion entities.54  Instead, reform proposals treat claim construction as part of
the solution to current patent issues.  Patent reform legislation would import
the process for claim construction used in the district courts—long
bemoaned by commentators—into U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
proceedings where the validity of the patent is challenged after the patent
has been issued by the PTO.55  Other patent reform proposals would stay
almost all discovery until after claim construction, on the assumption that
claim construction will successfully weed out frivolous or weak claims brought
by patent assertion entities.56
Even though claim construction has previously been blamed for uncer-
tain and broad claim scope, claim construction is rarely mentioned as a way
to reduce the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope in order to address the
patent assertion entity “problem.”  The most popular proposals focus on
strengthening the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the claims be “defi-
nite” and that the patent include a “written description” demonstrating that
the patentee possessed the invention at the time of filing and an enabling
disclosure that permits a skilled person in the field to make and use the
invention.57  Other proposals include reducing the ability of patentees to
hide or delay patent applications in the Patent and Trademark Office58 and
including glossaries of key claim terms within the patent.59  Claim construc-
tion, however, has been ignored.  To the contrary, overestimating the impact
of Phillips v. AWH Corp. in resolving the Federal Circuit’s methodological
split, the FTC concluded that current claim construction doctrine “marks a
beneficial step from the perspective of public notice.”60
The connection between patent assertion entities and claim construc-
tion has been recognized in the limited context of interpreting functional
claims in software patents.61  Professor Mark Lemley has suggested a particu-
lar solution to the problem of functional claiming in software patents by
interpreting functional claims as limited to the means for implementing the
function described in the patent.62  In essence, the proposal would except
functional claims in software patents from normal claim construction rules
and create special claim construction rules specific to software functional
claims—rules that are essentially a strong version of the patent-focused
approach.  Professor Lemley and others seem to assume that the problem
54 See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, http:/
/www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-pat-
ent-reform-legislation/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
55 See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9(b) (2015).
56 See PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 5 (2015); H.R. 9 § 3(d).
57 See YEH, supra note 22, at 17.
58 See id.
59 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 110–11 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
60 Id. at 102.
61 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 32, at 394.
62 See Lemley, supra note 33, at 943–49.
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with functional software claims results from the inherent indeterminacy of
software claims, rather than the problems with the claim construction pro-
cess addressed in this Article.63
Thus, the role of claim construction issues in facilitating the patent
assertion entity business model is an important issue that has been largely
absent from debates over patent assertion entities.  The converse is also true.
The beneficial effects for patent assertion entities have been largely over-
looked in the claim construction debates.
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AND TRENDS HAVE BENEFITED,
AND WILL, BENEFIT PATENT “TROLLS”
This Part turns to the intersection of the parallel debates over patent
assertion entities and claim construction explored in Part I.  Patent assertion
entities benefit from three major problems in claim construction: the meth-
odological split, the continued vitality of the general meaning approach, and
the appellate standard of review.  Surprisingly, while the general tide of pat-
ent law moves to limit and undermine patent assertion entities, claim con-
struction trends are unwittingly moving in the opposite direction, i.e., in ways
favorable to patent assertion entities.
A. The Claim Construction Split, Uncertainty, and Patent Assertion Entities
1. How the Claim Construction Split Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
In theory, competitors and the public should be able to “understand
what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and
prosecution history . . . and applying established rules of construction” and
“be able to rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text of
the patent and its associated public record and apply the established rules of
construction.”64  However, the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper
approach to claim construction makes it difficult to “understand what is the
scope of the patent owner’s rights” for two reasons.
First, there are no “established rules of construction.”  Rather, there are
two competing sets of rules for construction.  One set of rules starts with a
presumption in favor of the extrinsic, general meaning of the term in the
field and only looks to the use in the patent itself for a clear and unmistaka-
ble rebuttal of this presumption.  The other set of rules starts with the usage
of the term in the patent itself and only looks to extrinsic usage to help clar-
ify the intrinsic usage.  The scope of the patentee’s rights depends on the
choice between these two sets of rules.65  However, a competitor has no relia-
63 See id. at 919–28 (suggesting that the problem with software claims comes primarily
from the nature of software and the nature of claim drafting).
64 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
65 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 53, at 1170 (“The Federal Circuit’s claim
construction jurisprudence evinces a distinct split in methodological approach, a dichot-
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ble basis on which to choose between them, as both have significant prece-
dential support.66
Second, competitors cannot “rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will simi-
larly analyze” the claim terms.67  If a competitor chooses to act based on a
certain understanding of claim scope derived using one of the existing meth-
odological approaches, it cannot predict that an unknown judge construing
the claims in an unknown litigation will adopt the same approach.68  Differ-
ent judges take different approaches to claim construction and, often, even
the same judge will take different approaches to claim construction from
case to case.69
In this way, the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper approach to claim
construction is a contributor to the uncertainty of patent scope, perhaps a
significant contributor.  As one commentator explained, “[r]egardless of a
methodology’s specifics, an inherent certainty [would be] created once
courts decide on a single methodology.”70  There is near universal agree-
ment that uncertain patent scope is a significant factor in the rise and success
of patent assertion entities—a conclusion endorsed by the FTC,71 Congres-
sional Research Service,72 White House,73 academics,74 and technology com-
panies.75  If uncertain patent scope is a major factor fueling patent assertion
entities, and the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper claim construction
approach is a major cause of uncertain patent scope, the Federal Circuit’s
continued claim construction split inures to the benefit of patent assertion
entities.
I do not suggest that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split is the
sole cause of the uncertain patent scope on which patent assertion entities
prey.  Other factors are certainly at play, including “continuation” practice at
the Patent Office that allows patentees to write claims to cover later develop-
ments in the market, the inherent indeterminacy of language (or at least of
omy that both involves a significant number of decisions and appears to affect the results of
the cases.”).
66 See Cotropia, supra note 37, at 100 (“With only one methodology used, different
individuals more likely will interpret the claims in the same manner, and thus, a higher
likelihood of getting a similar result will exist.”).
67 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
68 See Cotropia, supra note 37, at 99 (“Without clear direction from the courts in the
form of a single methodology, one cannot predict a claim’s meaning because of the uncer-
tainty about which methodology will be used.”).
69 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 53, at 1143–45, 1162–71 (concluding that
“[t]he methodological approaches of individual judges on the Federal Circuit vary widely”
and that “most Federal Circuit judges have relatively similar levels of inconsistency in claim
construction methodology, but a small group is substantially more consistent”).
70 Cotropia, supra note 37, at 99.
71 See FTC REPORT, supra note 59, at 9.
72 See YEH, supra note 22, at 9.
73 See WHITE HOUSE PAE REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
74 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 32, at 393–94.
75 Google Inc., Comments on In re: Strategies for Improving Claim Clarity: Glossary Use in
Defining Claim Terms 5 (Oct. 23, 2013).
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describing software inventions in written words), and perhaps the indefinite-
ness doctrine.76  Professor Lemley is undoubtedly correct that widespread
use of functional claiming—which defines the invention by what it does, not
how it does it—in software patents is a major contributor to the patent
“thicket” that undermines public notice.77  And, as explained below in Sec-
tion II.B, the actual content of claim construction rules contribute to uncer-
tain patent scope.78  My claim is more modest: there is an important
connection between the claim construction split and patent assertion entities
that is being overlooked in both the debates over claim construction and the
debates over patent assertion entities.
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
To some extent, it is difficult to identify any “trend” in the case law and
commentary related to the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split for the
simple reason that the Federal Circuit has been significantly divided for a
decade and a half.79  Empirical evidence indicates that Federal Circuit opin-
ions in the years immediately after 2005’s Phillips v. AWH Corp.,80 where the
en banc court addressed the proper methodological approach, were as
divided on methodology as they were before.81  Anecdotal accounts offer a
more complex story in which early decisions after Phillips largely followed a
single, patent-focused methodology, with a more recent rise in the “ordinary
[or general] meaning” approach returning the Federal Circuit’s claim con-
struction doctrine to the same split that existed before Phillips.82
Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit is becoming more divided or
is simply as divided as ever, the existence and importance of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s methodological split is increasingly ignored or downplayed.  Post-Phil-
lips, attention to the split over claim construction probably peaked in 2011
with a vigorous dissent from the Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc
identifying “a fundamental split within the court as to . . . the proper
approach to claim interpretation.”83  However, the Federal Circuit’s method-
ological split is increasingly absent from patent debates.  For example, in
briefing to the Supreme Court in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the
76 See FTC REPORT, supra note 59, at 9–10, 15–16.
77 See Lemley, supra note 33.
78 See also Cotropia, supra note 37, at 100 (“The methodology chosen can still be
unpredictable in application because of the canons it chooses to use.”).
79 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–5
(2000) (describing split between what the author labeled “pragmatic textualism” and
“hyper textualism”).
80 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
81 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 133–35 (finding “virtually no change”
in methodological split after Phillips through 2007).
82 See Carlson & Dubal, supra note 51.
83 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc).
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indefiniteness doctrine at issue in that case was blamed for uncertain patent
scope, with the role of claim construction and the claim construction split
ignored.84  Moreover, in reactions to the Supreme Court’s adoption of a
more deferential standard of review for claim construction in Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., commentators have described the
Federal Circuit as having a singular “established methodology for construing
claims,”85 overlooking the deep methodological split that Professors Wagner
and Petherbridge empirically reconfirmed only a year before Teva.86  Two
leading commentators even hope that Teva solved longstanding claim con-
struction problems, optimistically suggesting that implementation of Teva
could result in “effective, transparent, and well-reasoned patent claim con-
structions” and that “patent litigation will become more predictable and
understandable.”87  Again, the methodological split and its contribution to
uncertain patent scope are overlooked.
Downplaying or ignoring the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper
approach to claim construction is good for patent assertion entities.  Patent
assertion entities benefit from the uncertain claim scope resulting from the
absence of a single approach to claim construction.  The longer the Federal
Circuit’s split persists, the better for patent assertion entities’ prospects.  And
the less attention the split receives, the longer it is likely to remain.  Unsur-
prisingly, the patent stakeholders actually focused on the connection
between the methodological split, uncertain patent scope, and patent asser-
tion entities are the major technology companies most frequently targeted by
patent assertion entities.88
B. The General Meaning Approach, Unpredictability, Overbreadth,
and Patent Assertion Entities
1. How the General Meaning Approach Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
Beyond the mere existence of a split over claim construction approach,
the content of claim construction rules also affect the prospects for patent
assertion entities.  Different approaches to claim construction differ in the
degree of predictability and breadth of claim scope they produce.89  For rea-
sons previously explained, patent assertion entities prefer a claim construc-
tion approach that tends to produce less predictable and broader claim
scope.90  The “general meaning” approach to claim construction—where
84 See Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1353, 1353–55 (2014).
85 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
538, 552 (2015).
86 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 144–145.
87 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in Patent Claim
Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 198 (2015).
88 See Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19, at 14–15.
89 See Cotropia, supra note 37, at 100.
90 See supra subsection II.A.2.
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claim construction starts with extrinsic sources as to the abstract meaning in
the field of invention and only looks to the specification for a clear deviation
from this abstract meaning—does exactly that.
Some scholars believe that the general meaning approach results in
more predictable claim scope.91  They assume that skilled people can simply
apply their own understanding of the claim term—an understanding that
reflects the general understanding in the field—with confidence that the
claim construction adopted in subsequent litigation will reflect this under-
standing.92  While theoretically sound, this represents an idealized view of
actual litigation.  The incentives in litigation are likely to result in a battle of
experts (or expert texts) each asserting a “general meaning” that is most
favorable to its side’s litigation position, regardless of any connection to any
actual “general meaning” in the field (to the extent one even exists).93  Nor
are generalist judges well-situated to sort through the ex post, litigation-
driven “general meanings” and accurately identify the true “general mean-
ing” in the field.94
Anecdotal evidence from those on the ground confirms that scholars are
overly optimistic when they assume the “general meaning” approach pro-
motes predictability of claim scope.  The FTC surveyed a wide range of stake-
holders within the patent system, finding, among other things, that there was
widespread concern about uncertain patent scope, especially in the informa-
tion technology sector.  Importantly, though, the FTC noted that “[t]hose
who found claim construction manageable emphasized the importance of
looking beyond the claims themselves and relying heavily on review of the
patent’s description of the invention to sort out claim meaning.”95  A group
of the nation’s leading information technology companies—the industry in
which patent notice problems are widely agreed to be most severe96—con-
cur: “Decisions that divorce claim terms from the context of the written
description entrench claim ambiguity and litigation uncertainty.”97
The patent-focused approach encourages heavy reliance on the specifi-
cation to understand claim meaning, whereas the “general meaning”
approach limits reliance on the specification to explicit definitions or clear
disclaimers of claim scope.  “From a notice perspective,” the patent-focused
approach “works best.”98  As the FTC explained, when claim construction is
primarily driven by the patent itself, “[a] third party seeking to understand a
claim’s meaning can view the intrinsic evidence by reading the patent and
consulting the file wrapper (containing the prosecution history).  The mate-
91 See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 144–145.
92 See id.
93 See Reilly, supra note 34, at 271–277.
94 See id.
95 FTC REPORT, supra note 59, at 82.
96 See id. at 80; YEH, supra note 22, at 9.
97 Google et al. Lighting Ballast Br., supra note 19, at 25 n.3.
98 FTC REPORT, supra note 59, at 102.
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rial is easily identifiable by, and accessible to, third parties” ex ante.99  By
contrast, when claim construction emphasizes the supposed “general mean-
ing” in the technical field, claim meaning depends on external texts and
expert testimony identified or developed ex post for purposes of litigation.
“A third party therefore cannot know in advance what external evidence will
be utilized” because there are a variety of potential external texts or expert
witnesses which will support a variety of supposed “general meanings.”100
Thus, the patent-focused approach better promotes predictability of claim
scope, whereas the general meaning approach increases the unpredictability
of claim scope upon which patent assertion entities rely.101
The different claim construction methodologies also produce different
claim scope.  Specifically, the general meaning approach will tend to pro-
duce broader claim scope than the patent-focused approach.102  Even those
generally supportive of the general meaning approach acknowledge that it is
likely to “yield broader interpretations.”103  This is because the patent-
focused approach limits the context available for claim construction to that
found in the patent itself.  “The patent’s disclosure sets a ceiling for the
claim’s meaning, and thus, the literal scope of exclusivity afforded to the
patent.”104  By contrast, the general meaning approach “moves the claim
term’s meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract,” which will
naturally expand the potential claim scope.105  The specification does not
generally limit claim scope under this approach.106  Rather, the only limit on
claim scope is the ability to find some expert text, however tangentially rele-
vant, or some paid expert witness to support a supposed “general
meaning.”107
99 Id.
100 Id. at 102 (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE 64 (2009));
id. at 102 n.181 (quoting a stakeholder as saying that “if you start to look at external
records, even in biotech, there you can probably find five different people to say five differ-
ent things”).
101 See Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19, at 10–11 (endorsing patent-focused
approach and rejecting general meaning approach based on certainty concerns).
102 See Carlson & Dubal, supra note 51 (noting that claims are “overwhelmingly con-
strued broadly” under the general meaning approach, which authors refer to as “heavy
presumption of ordinary meaning” standard); Cotropia, supra note 37, at 121–22 (noting
that the “heavy presumption,” i.e., general meaning, methodology may give the patentee
“the greatest possible breadth of patent protection”).
103 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 53, at 1142 (referring to the “general mean-
ing” approach as “procedural methodology”); see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (acknowledging that the “general meaning”
approach can produce claim scope broader than a patent-focused approach but arguing
that this is a problem of invalidity).
104 Cotropia, supra note 37, at 108.
105 Id. at 114 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
106 See id. at 110.
107 See Reilly, supra note 34, at 276–77.
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Thus, the general meaning approach to claim construction produces
unpredictable and broad claim scope, the very conditions in which patent
assertion entities thrive.108  Unsurprisingly, in litigation, patent assertion
entities often rely on the general meaning approach in formulating claim
construction positions.  As one practitioner explained,
[w]hen the claim construction phase occurs, the claim construction pro-
posed by plaintiff in such [patent “troll”] cases is typically superficial, often
consisting of “no construction required,” “plain and ordinary meaning” or
“dictionary definition,” with the goal a construction that results in infringe-
ment with some wiggle room to avoid prior art.109
Two other practitioners concluded that “[p]atent trolls excel[ ] under this
[general meaning] standard, with infringement easier to prove, and patent
invalidity always an elusive and risky path.”110  Probably for these exact rea-
sons, the most common targets of patent assertion entities—the nation’s
leading technology companies—vehemently rejected the general meaning
approach and endorsed the patent-focused approach, arguing that “[i]t is
improper to ignore the specification in favor of a ‘plain meaning’ analysis
divorced from the context of the patent.”111
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Even as the patent community is increasingly obsessed with how to com-
bat patent assertion entities, the claim construction case law and scholarship
are moving in favor of patent assertion entities’ preferred claim construction
methodology: the general meaning approach.
The case law long has been split between the “general meaning” and
patent-focused approaches, a split that Professors Wagner and Petherbridge
found to have remained fairly consistent after the Federal Circuit’s 2005 Phil-
lips decision, at least through 2007 (the end of their study).112  However,
anecdotal reports suggest that in the past few years “claim construction law
for now is swinging in the direction” of the “general meaning” approach,
with more cases taking this approach than before and the newer Federal Cir-
cuit judges favoring it.113  Moreover, although the Supreme Court’s decision
in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. addressed the standard of
appellate review, not methodology, for claim construction, the Court did
endorse the district court’s “consult[ing] extrinsic evidence in order to
understand . . . the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant
108 See supra subsection I.A.2.
109 Christopher Hu, Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem, 26 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2014) (citing Joshua Brustein, Troll Fighting: Anatomy of a Patent
Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-
09-17/troll-fighting-anatomy-of-a-patent-lawsuit).
110 Carlson & Dubal, supra note 51 (referring to the “general meaning” approach as
“heavy presumption” methodology).
111 Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19, at 22.
112 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 134–35, 135 tbl.6.3.
113 Carlson & Dubal, supra note 51.
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time period.”114  Some scholars have read this as consistent with an approach
to claim construction that starts with extrinsic evidence about the meaning of
the term in the field and only then checks to see if the intrinsic evidence is
inconsistent with this meaning, i.e., an approach similar to the general mean-
ing approach.115
Teva could result in greater use of the “general meaning” approach for
an additional reason.  Under Teva, district courts receive deference for find-
ings on subsidiary factual issues underpinning claim construction, such as the
general meaning of the term in the technical field or resolution of conflict-
ing expert testimony, but no deference when claim construction is based
solely on the intrinsic evidence within the patent document and prosecution
history.116  This gives district judges incentives to rely heavily on extrinsic
evidence and expert testimony—such as by using the general meaning
approach, not the patent-focused approach—in order to ensure deferential
review from the Federal Circuit.117  On the other hand, the incentive Teva
provides district courts to use the general meaning approach may be counter-
balanced by the incentive it provides the Federal Circuit to emphasize
greater or exclusive use of the intrinsic record—consistent with the patent-
focused approach—so as to avoid having to defer to district court claim
constructions.118
Beyond the case law, claim construction scholarship increasingly favors
the “general meaning” approach.  In the past, the scholarship, like the case
law, was divided between the patent-focused and general meaning
approaches.119  However, recent work from leading scholars endorses, to
varying extents, approaches to claim construction more consistent with the
general meaning approach than the patent-focused approach.  Professors
Wagner and Petherbridge explicitly endorse “[a]n approach to patent claim
construction that firmly embraces the commonly understood meaning of
words and places the burden on the patent applicant to clearly explain any
deviations from the ordinary meaning” and reject “an open-ended search for
114 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
115 See Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz, PATENT-
LYO (Jan. 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deference-supreme-sandoz
.html (quoting Professor Rantanen but noting that other commentators disagreed); see also
Anderson & Menell, supra note 87, at 198 (arguing that Teva “affords [district courts]
greater flexibility to use familiar tools for resolving factual disputes—presentation of
[extrinsic] evidence and expert testimony”). But cf. Rantanen, supra note 85, at 550
(acknowledging that it is still “business as usual at the Federal Circuit”).
116 See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
117 See Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19, at 23.
118 See Rantanen, supra note 85, at 550–52 (suggesting that this has been Federal Cir-
cuit’s reaction to Teva).
119 Compare, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 37 (endorsing patent-focused approach), and
Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 333 (2007) (same), with, e.g., Osenga, supra note 39 (endorsing an approach more
similar to “general meaning” approach), and Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 53
(same).
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‘contextual’ meaning in the patent document and prosecution history.”120
Similarly, Professor Rantanen advocates for
a claim construction process where the judge begins by making a factual
determination about the meaning of a claim term to a person of skill in the
art [using extrinsic evidence] and then considers the intrinsic evidence of
the patent to arrive at a legal conclusion as to its meaning in the patent.121
Professor Crouch believes that “the rule that extrinsic evidence is of secon-
dary importance and perhaps should not be considered absent ambiguity in
the intrinsic evidence . . . is contrary to the rule that the interpretation
should be based upon the contemporary understanding of a person having
ordinary skill in the art.”122  And Professors Anderson and Menell criticize
relying just on the intrinsic evidence and instead endorse an approach that
“place[s] greater emphasis on skilled artisans, inventors, patent attorneys,
and patent agents in tracing the drafting of patent claim terms and their
understanding to skilled artisans in the context of the particular patent.”123
The recent cases and scholarship favoring the general meaning
approach to claim construction seem not to appreciate the beneficial effects
this approach has for patent assertion entities.  This trend is again inconsis-
tent with the general tide of patent law, which aims to reduce the prevalence
and power of patent assertion entities.
C. The Standard of Review, Forum Choice, and Patent Assertion Entities
1. How Deferential Review Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
The appropriate appellate standard of review for claim construction—
the Federal Circuit’s long-standing de novo standard or some more deferen-
tial standard—has received extensive attention over the past fifteen years.124
Despite the volumes of ink spilled, there has been little development of the
connection between the standard of review and patent assertion entities.  If
anything, the ubiquitous contention that more deferential review will
increase certainty of patent scope125 could suggest that deferential review will
undermine patent assertion entities.
As I have explained elsewhere, more deferential appellate review of
claim construction is unlikely to have a significant impact on certainty of
claim scope.126  Deferential review may improve, to some extent, the ex post
120 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 144.
121 Rantanen, supra note 85, at 555.
122 Dennis Crouch, Teva v. Sandoz: Partial Deference in Claim Construction, PATENTLYO
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/partial-deference-construction
.html.
123 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 75 (2014) (citing Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536 (1947)).
124 See supra subsection I.B.2.
125 See supra subsection I.B.2.
126 See generally Reilly, supra note 42.
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certainty of claim construction after the district court has issued its claim
construction.  Even this is unlikely to be significant as long as the method-
ological split exists because the district judge’s choice of methodology is a
question of law subject to de novo review, even if the underlying claim con-
struction is reviewed deferentially.  More importantly, deferential appellate
review has no impact on the far more important question of ex ante predict-
ability, i.e., whether claim scope can accurately be predicted in advance of
litigation.  Thus, the likelihood that deferential review of claim construction
will improve predictability of claim scope in a way that will affect patent asser-
tion entities is low.
On the other hand, in two ways, deferential review of claim construction
is likely to benefit patent assertion entities.  First, as discussed above in sub-
section II.B.2, deferential review incentivizes district judges to place greater
reliance on the general meaning approach to claim construction and extrin-
sic evidence more generally.127  The result is likely to be greater uncertainty
and breadth of claim scope, the exact conditions in which patent assertion
entities thrive.128
Second, the more deferential standard of review provides greater power
and discretion to the district judge.129  Some may see this as a benefit of
deferential review, as the Federal Circuit is often seen as too powerful and
self-aggrandizing.130  Similarly, some may believe that deferential review, and
therefore less power for the Federal Circuit, will undermine patent assertion
entities, since the Federal Circuit is often seen as pro-patentee.131  However,
empirical evidence demonstrates that, at least in recent years, the Federal
Circuit used its de novo review power to the detriment of patentees.  Profes-
sor Cotropia’s study of Federal Circuit claim construction decisions between
2010 and 2013 found that “[l]ower court decisions where the patentee wins
are more likely to be subject to a claim construction reversal that prompts a
change in the case’s outcome,” whereas “in cases where the patentee loses
127 See also Anderson & Menell, supra note 123, at 75–77 (endorsing deferential review
exactly because it will lead to greater emphasis on extrinsic texts and expert witnesses);
Rantanen, supra note 85, at 554–55 (hoping that deferential review will lead to this result).
128 See supra subsection II.B.1.  This is true unless the incentives the Federal Circuit has
to emphasize the intrinsic record, so as to increase its ability to review claim construction
de novo under Teva, leads it to resolve the claim construction spilt in favor of the patent-
only approach. See supra subsection II.B.1.
129 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law 37 (June 2015) (unpub-
lished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412
(describing how Teva and other Supreme Court decisions “elevat[e] district courts and the
PTO in influence relative to the Federal Circuit” (footnote omitted)).
130 Id. (describing how Federal Circuit “tends to enhance its own power” and how de
novo review of claim construction “allowed the Federal Circuit to assume greater power
over a crucial aspect of patent litigation”).
131 Id. at 35 (describing Federal Circuit as “a pro-patent institution”).
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below . . . the claim construction affirmance rate is the highest.”132  These
effects were strongest “in cases involving electronic, information technology,
or business method patents,”133 the very areas in which patent assertion enti-
ties are most prevalent.  Thus, assuming more deferential review of claim
construction results in fewer reversals, patentees, especially patent assertion
entities, will benefit, since reversals under de novo review were concentrated
in cases where the patentee won below in the technical areas where patent
assertion entities are the most active.
This potential result of deferential review is exacerbated by the increas-
ing recognition that judges in certain districts, especially the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, seek to attract patent litigation by
distorting their decisions in favor of the patentee (who chooses the forum),
or “forum selling.”134  As a result, twenty-eight percent of 2014 patent cases
were filed in the Eastern District of Texas,135 as were an astounding forty-
four percent of patent cases filed in the first half of 2015.136  Patent assertion
entities in particular prefer to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas.137  To
date, the Eastern District’s primary means for attracting patent cases has
been pro-patentee procedures.138  However, increased deference to district
court claim construction decisions makes substantive differences between dis-
tricts on claim construction more important, as they would be more likely to
withstand appellate scrutiny.  This will provide even greater incentives for
patentees, including patent assertion entities, to file in the districts most
favorable to them.139  It also could incentivize the Eastern District of Texas,
132 Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Review Deference or Correction
Driven?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962.
133 Id.
134 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631
(2015); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538857.
135 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 134, at 8 tbl.1.
136 Brian Howard, 2015 First Half Patent Case Filing Trends, LEXMACHINA (July 14, 2015),
https://lexmachina.com/2015-first-half-patent-case-filing-trends/ (finding that 1387 of
3122 patent cases filed in first half of 2015 were filed in Eastern District of Texas).
137 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 24 (2013) (finding that patent assertion entities “filed more lawsuits in the
Eastern District of Texas than other types of plaintiffs” and that thirty-nine percent of their
cases were filed there compared to eight percent of cases filed by other types of plaintiffs).
138 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 134, at 9.
139 See, e.g., Brief for Intel Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 19,
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (No. 13-854) [hereinafter
Intel et al. Teva Br.] (suggesting that patent assertion entities are “especially likely to
exploit forum-shopping opportunities” created by deferential review of claim
construction).
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and other forum selling districts, to compete for patentees by offering them
even more favorable (likely broader) claim construction decisions.140
Rough empirical evidence suggests that the Eastern District of Texas
already does so.141  The leading, or perhaps most extreme, example of the
general meaning approach favored by patent assertion entities was Texas Digi-
tal Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,142 a decision subsequently “renounced”143
(even if not formally overruled) by the en banc Federal Circuit’s 2005 Phillips
decision.144  The leading example of the patent-focused approach is proba-
bly Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., a decision that was expressly reaffirmed
by Phillips.145  Unsurprisingly given their relative precedential status, Phillips
was cited nine times more frequently than Texas Digital nationwide from
2006–2013 and Vitronics six times more frequently than Texas Digital.  But in
the Eastern District of Texas, Phillips was cited only four times more fre-
quently than Texas Digital and Vitronics only three times more frequently than
Texas Digital.146  Thus, while the Eastern District cites Phillips and Vitronics at
rates comparable to elsewhere, it cites the patent-assertion-entity-friendly
Texas Digital general meaning decision far more frequently than normal.147
This is consistent with, though hardly dispositive of, a conclusion that the
Eastern District of Texas’s claim construction decisions benefit patent asser-
tion entities, decisions that are more likely to withstand appellate scrutiny
under deferential review.
On the other hand, Professors Anderson and Menell found that the
Eastern District of Texas does not fare worse on appellate review of claim
140 Cf. Anderson & Menell, supra note 123, at 69–70 (noting an argument that de novo
review could control “renegade districts” but rejecting it because the Eastern District of
Texas does not have an unusual reversal rate compared to other districts).
141 This is a quick study, not a comprehensive analysis.  It shares the problems of any
study relying on decisions reported on Westlaw or Lexis.  Moreover, it does not account for
what purpose the cases were cited or their effects on outcomes; for example, the Eastern
District may be citing Texas Digital for a basic point of law not renounced in Phillips.
142 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Mullally, supra note 119, at 354.
143 Mullally, supra note 119, at 358.
144 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
145 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1312.
146 Phillips was issued, and Texas Digital renounced and Vitronics reaffirmed, on July 12,
2005.  My study started with January 1, 2006, to allow district courts to adjust to Phillips.
Citations were calculated via Westlaw by entering the citation for each decision; clicking on
the “Citing References” function; limiting to cases; limiting to Jan. 1, 2006–Dec. 31, 2013;
limiting to district courts; limiting by “hide negative.”  For each decision, citations were
then limited just to “E.D. Tex” and again limited to hide negative.  Nationwide, there were
2832 cites to Phillips, 1995 cites to Vitronics, and 328 cites to Texas Digital.  In the Eastern
District of Texas, there were 437 cites to Phillips, 312 cites to Vitronics, and 107 cites to
Texas Digital.
147 According to Lex Machina, 16.7% of claim construction orders from 2006–2013
were from the Eastern District of Texas.  Fifteen point four percent of non-negative cita-
tions to Phillips and 15.6% of non-negative citations to Vitronics were from the Eastern
District, but 32.6% of non-negative citations to Texas Digital were from the Eastern District.
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construction than other districts.148  For that reason, they rejected any con-
cern that deferential review of claim construction was problematic in light of
the existence of “renegade” districts like the Eastern District of Texas.149
While interesting, it is difficult to know how much weight to give to appellate
reversal rates in evaluating the Eastern District’s performance, given the exis-
tence of significant selection effects regarding the cases that reach final deci-
sion and are appealed.150  More importantly, even if the Eastern District of
Texas has not skewed claim construction in a pro-patentee direction in the
past—perhaps because of the threat of reversal under de novo review—defer-
ential review after Teva gives it greater opportunity and incentive to do so in
the future.
Thus, deferential review of claim construction is unlikely to reduce
uncertainty in a way that will affect patent assertion entities.  By contrast, it is
likely to increase use of the patent-assertion-entity-friendly general meaning
approach, as well as increase the power and importance of the district courts
most favorable to patent assertion entities.  Overall, deferential review of
claim construction is good news for patent assertion entities.  Unsurprisingly,
the nation’s leading technology companies (again, the most popular target
of patent assertion entities) bucked conventional wisdom in recent years and
argued for retention of the Federal Circuit’s de novo review standard.151
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Claim construction is undoubtedly moving in favor of more deferential
appellate review.  Again, this trend is out of step with general concerns about
the effect of patent assertion entities on the patent system.
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s de novo standard of review, holding instead
that some measure of deference was appropriate in reviewing district court
claim construction decisions.  Specifically, the Court held that a district
court’s “subsidiary factual findings about [the] extrinsic evidence . . . must be
reviewed for clear error on appeal,” though the Federal Circuit should “still
review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo.”152  “On
its face, Teva v. Sandoz unquestionably altered the standard of review for
claim construction, shifting it towards greater deference to the district
courts.”153  Commentators generally have praised the Supreme Court’s adop-
148 Anderson & Menell, supra note 123, at 70.
149 Id. at 69.
150 For example, the Eastern District of Texas grants summary judgment at approxi-
mately one fourth the rate of other districts. See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 134, at
10–12, 50.  This means that obtaining an appealable final decision in the Eastern District is
more likely to require incurring the entire expense and risk of trial. Id.
151 See Google et al. Teva Br., supra note 19; Intel et al. Teva Br., supra note 139; Google
et al. Lighting Ballast Br., supra note 19.
152 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
153 Rantanen, supra note 85, at 544.
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tion of more deferential claim construction review.154  Some commentators
even have criticized the Federal Circuit for not vigorously implementing def-
erential review post-Teva and urged an expansive reading of the deferential
review required by Teva.155
III. LESSONS FROM THE INTERSECTION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
AND PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES
This Part turns from the descriptive to the normative.  Part II described
the overlooked connection between claim construction and patent assertion
entities, as well as how patent assertion entities benefit from problems and
trends in claim construction doctrine.  This Part addresses what this descrip-
tive account means for the patent system.
A. If You Care About Patent Assertion Entities, You Should Care
About Claim Construction
A sometimes fierce debate exists within the patent community as to
whether patent assertion entities are good, bad, or neutral for the patent
system.156  This Article does not take sides in that debate.  Regardless of
one’s views of patent assertion entities, it is useful to recognize the connec-
tion to claim construction issues and trends.
For those who believe that concerns about patent assertion entities are
overblown or that patent assertion entities play a beneficial role in the patent
system, this Article will probably be of little import.  Hopefully, they will find
the descriptive account interesting and recognition of the relationship
between claim construction doctrine and patent assertion entities useful.
However, they will be undisturbed by the fact that the issues and trends in
claim construction help patent assertion entities, though perhaps (as I do157)
they will find the issues and trends in claim construction problematic in their
own right.
On the other hand, for the majority of the patent community concerned
(to some extent) about patent assertion entities, this Article should serve as a
wake-up call.  Problems with claim construction are generally ignored in
debates and reforms related to patent assertion entities.  If anything, claim
construction is treated as a solution, not a cause, of the “patent troll prob-
lem.”158  This Article suggests that claim construction problems contribute to
the effectiveness of patent assertion entities.  More troubling, claim construc-
tion doctrine and commentary is moving in a direction that favors patent
assertion entities.  If patent assertion entities are as problematic as many in
the patent community believe, then it is important to address the underlying
problems of claim construction and reconsider the direction in which claim
154 E.g., Anderson & Menell, supra note 87; Rantanen, supra note 85.
155 E.g., Rantanen, supra note 85, at 550–51.
156 See supra Section I.A.
157 See Reilly, supra note 84; Reilly, supra note 42; Reilly, supra note 34.
158 See supra Section I.C.
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construction is moving.  Those in the crosshairs of patent assertion entities—
the nation’s leading technology companies—seem to have reached this very
conclusion.159
This Article also contributes to debates over claim construction.  At
times, claim construction feels as if it is in a time warp, with the battle lines
and arguments drawn in the early 2000s and little changed in the intervening
years, despite significant changes in the patent litigation landscape.  Claim
construction is the one area immune from analysis about how the rise of
patent assertion entities over the past decade has changed the patent land-
scape.  Likewise, the dramatic concentration of patent cases in the Eastern
District of Texas over the past decade plays little part in claim construction
discussions.  Commentators praise recent developments in claim construc-
tion, like the Teva decision, even as they acknowledge that the success of
these developments depends on faithful implementation by district
judges.160  Whether this will occur is questionable in the current patent liti-
gation landscape, where approaching half of all patent cases are filed in a
single district exactly because that district has consistently applied the law in
a way to favor patentees, including patent assertion entities.161
Those debating claim construction issues would be well-advised to con-
sider the consequences for patent assertion entities of various approaches to
claim construction.  Some may believe that trends in claim construction
rules, like deferential review and the general meaning approach, are war-
ranted despite (or except for) the positive effect for patent assertion entities.
That certainly could be true, though I have previously doubted it.162  Regard-
less, the consequences for patent assertion entities are a cost of these trends
that should be weighed in any cost-benefit analysis of claim construction
rules.
This is not to say that claim construction doctrine should be applied
differently in cases brought by patent assertion entities or designed in a par-
ticular way solely to combat patent assertion entities.  Rather, I agree with
Professor Lemley and Douglas Melamed that “[p]atent trolls alone are not
the problem; they are a symptom of larger problems with the patent sys-
tem.”163  This Article builds on their work.  That patent assertion entities
159 See Google et al. Lighting Ballast Br., supra note 19, at 4 (“[T]he root causes of
uncertainty in claim construction are vaguely drafted claims and contradictory claim-con-
struction methodologies, not appellate review.  Deference would not ameliorate those
causes of uncertainty; it would make them worse.  Deference would . . . incentivize [district
judges] to rely more on the extrinsic evidence presented in any given case, and less on
what a patent actually says, in hopes of securing greater deference.”).
160 Anderson & Menell, supra note 87, at 197–99.  To be fair, in other work, Professors
Anderson and Menell recognize (but dismiss) the relationship of deferential review of
claim construction and “renegade” districts like the Eastern District of Texas.  Anderson &
Menell, supra note 123, at 69–70.
161 See supra subsection II.C.1; see also Anderson, supra note 134, at 632; Klerman &
Reilly, supra note 134, at 3.
162 See Reilly, supra note 84; Reilly, supra note 42; Reilly, supra note 34.
163 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 18, at 2121.
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thrive under current claim construction doctrine and trends suggests that
claim construction is one of those “larger problems” of which patent asser-
tion entities are a “symptom.”164  As Lemley and Melamed conclude,
“[e]xposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate changes in patent
law that will actually tackle the underlying pathologies of the patent system
and the abusive conduct they enable.”165  There is a need to reconsider claim
construction rules and trends not simply because they help patent assertion
entities but because this effect suggests claim construction doctrine is prob-
lematic in its own right.
To be clear, this Article only argues that reversing current trends in
claim construction could help address the success and influence of patent
assertion entities, not that it is the only way of doing so.  It is possible that
other patent reforms will successfully combat patent assertion entities, with-
out the need for any changes to the general doctrine or trends in claim con-
struction.  For example, perhaps venue reform that limits the ability to file in
the Eastern District of Texas will undermine patent assertion entities.166
Similarly, Professor Lemley’s suggestion for limiting software functional
claiming could be sufficient to address patent assertion entities.  Over half of
patent assertion entity cases involve software patents,167 and estimates are
that one hundred percent of the software claims asserted by patent assertion
entities use functional claim language.168  To some extent, Professor Lem-
ley’s proposal is consistent with the analysis in this Article.  This Article sug-
gests that a persistent split in the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
precedent and the continued vitality of the general meaning approach to
claim construction are significant factors in the uncertainty and overbreadth
of claim scope on which patent assertion entities rely.169  Professor Lemley
would create special rules for interpreting software functional claims that are
more consistent with the patent-focused approach than the general meaning
approach.  Doing so would mitigate the problems created by the persistence
of both the claim construction split generally and the general meaning
approach specifically, perhaps sufficiently to severely undermine patent
assertion entities’ prospects of success.
For several reasons, however, it is still important to recognize the con-
nection between general claim construction problems and patent assertion
entities.  First, approximately forty percent of patent assertion entity cases do
not involve functional software claims and would be unaffected by Professor
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See Anderson & Menell, supra note 123, at 70 (arguing that venue is a better tool “to
address concerns about districts seeking to attract patent cases” than de novo review of
claim construction).
167 Bessen et al., supra note 26, at 29 (finding that sixty-two percent of patents asserted
in patent assertion entity cases were software patents).
168 Lemley, supra note 33, at 920 n.65.
169 See supra Sections II.A–B.
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Lemley’s proposal.170  Second, although the en banc Federal Circuit recently
expanded the circumstances in which claims will be deemed so-called
“means-plus-function” claims that are limited to the corresponding structure
disclosed in the specification,171 Professor Lemley’s broader proposal to limit
all functional claims to the means for performing the function disclosed in
the specification has not been adopted.  Third, even if Professor Lemley’s
proposal was adopted, the line between functional and non-functional claims
is murky.  Skilled claim drafters are likely to find creative ways to write claims
that are the equivalent of functional claims while avoiding the “functional”
label and the special claim construction rules that would come with it.
B. Claim Construction Problems Undermine Other Efforts to Combat
Patent Assertion Entities
To this point, I have focused on how the problems and trends in claim
construction directly benefit patent assertion entities.  But claim construction
doctrine is relevant to the debate over patent assertion entities for another,
indirect reason.  The problems and trends in claim construction undermine
the effectiveness of many of the leading proposals to combat patent assertion
entities.
Most proposals to combat patent assertion entities are motivated by the
belief that patent assertion entities bring weak claims and that mechanisms
are needed to deter or weed out these weak claims.  Proposals abound,
including heightened pleading requirements, fee shifting, and Rule 11 sanc-
tions.172  These proposals generally require a determination that the claim
lacked merit when brought.  This is obviously true of heightened pleading
requirements.  It is also true of Rule 11 sanctions, which require the conten-
tions in the complaint to have factual and legal support at the time the attor-
ney signs and files the complaint.173  Likewise, proposals that would require
the non-prevailing party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the prevailing party
would excuse fee shifting if “the position and conduct of the nonprevailing
party or parties were reasonably justified in law and fact,” or something signif-
icantly equivalent.174
However, under the current state of claim construction, requirements
like “reasonably justified” and “plausible” are very low thresholds for the pat-
entee to pass.  An issued patent benefits from the statutory presumption of
170 Bessen et al., supra note 26, at 29.
171 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in rele-
vant part).
172 See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. at 6–7 (2015) (as introduced in the
House, Feb. 5, 2015) (providing for heightened pleading requirements and fee shifting);
Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolls: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 325–32 (2014) (proposing greater use of Rule 11
sanctions).
173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
174 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. at 7 (2015) (as introduced in the House, Feb.
5, 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 29 30-MAR-16 12:15
2016] “ trolls ”  and  claim  construction 1073
validity, which likely is sufficient for a plaintiff to be “reasonably justified” or
“plausible” in believing the patent is not invalid.  Claim construction is often
decisive or determinative as to the infringement question.175  In light of the
issues with claim construction discussed above, how difficult is it really for a
patentee to identify a “reasonably justified” or “plausible” claim construction
(and therefore infringement) position?176  The patentee has two equally
valid claim construction methodologies from which to choose, methodolo-
gies that result in differing claim scope.  As a result of the continued vitality
of the general meaning approach, the patentee need only be able to find a
dictionary, scientific text, or paid expert willing to support its claim construc-
tion position in order for it to be “reasonably justified” and “plausible.”
Due to the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim scope under cur-
rent claim construction doctrine, the patentee will fairly easily be able to state
a plausible, good faith claim at the time of filing.  Thus, efforts to address the
patent assertion entity “problem” that rely on identifying claims that lack
merit at the time of filing may prove ineffective.177
CONCLUSION
For too long, the vigorous debates over patent assertion entities and
claim construction have operated independent of each other.  Current
problems and trends in claim construction have important consequences for
debates over patent assertion entities, as they tend to help the litigation posi-
tion of patent assertion entities.  Those concerned about patent assertion
entities would be well-advised to reconsider the direction that claim construc-
tion is moving.  Those concerned about claim construction would be well-
advised to consider the consequences of various claim construction rules for
patent assertion entities.  This Article contributes to both the debates over
patent assertion entities and the debates over claim construction by recogniz-
ing the important but overlooked links between claim construction and pat-
ent assertion entities.
175 See supra subsection I.B.1.
176 See Rogers & Jeon, supra note 172, at 319 (noting that “any independent, good-faith
construction” and any construction that is “not frivolous” would bar Rule 11 sanctions).
But see Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(finding case exceptional for purposes of fee shifting because “the written description pro-
vides no support for Taurus’s unreasonably broad construction”).
177 Cf. Shubha Ghosh, Fee Shifting as Patent Policy Lever: How to Ensure Sufficient Torque,
PATENTLYO (May 19, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/shifting-policy-suffi-
cient.html (suggesting that fee shifting may only be effective if mandatory, not subject to
factors like a party’s litigation position).
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